Scope: federal constitutional law and Pennsylvania law, current as of August 22, 2026. This field is moving unusually quickly. The official decisions, dockets, statutes, and agency pages cited below were checked on the date shown. Later orders, guidance, or program changes may alter the analysis.
The short version
Four developments define the 2026 landscape for a Pennsylvania gun owner. First, the Supreme Court decided two Second Amendment cases in June: one rejected a prosecution based only on a person's regular marijuana use, without proof of addiction, contemporaneous intoxication, incapacity, or dangerousness; the other rejected Hawaii's default rule against licensed concealed carry in private businesses open to the public unless the owner gave express permission. Second, the Third Circuit—the federal appeals court covering Pennsylvania—has issued narrow but important rulings for Bryan Range and for 18-to-20-year-old adults, and both judgments remain in force. Third, the Department of Justice has issued a final federal firearm-rights-restoration rule and announced a staged launch beginning in September, after more than three decades without a usable federal process. Fourth, federal and Pennsylvania firearm disabilities remain separate. A victory or restoration under one system does not automatically open the other.
The doctrine in ninety seconds
Federal constitutional law. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), directs courts to ask first whether the Second Amendment's plain text covers the conduct. If it does, the government must justify the regulation by showing consistency with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), then explained that a modern law need not have a historical twin: the historical and modern laws must be relevantly similar in why and how they burden the right. The Court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) as applied to Rahimi because a court had found that he posed a credible threat to another person's physical safety, and the temporary prohibition fit the historical principle permitting disarmament of a person who presents that kind of threat.
United States v. Hemani: regular drug use was not enough on this record
In United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234, slip op. (U.S. June 18, 2026), the government relied on Hemani's admission that he used marijuana every other day. It did not offer evidence that he possessed a firearm while intoxicated, was addicted, could not manage his affairs, or posed a danger to others. All nine Justices agreed that this prosecution under the unlawful-user provision of § 922(g)(3) could not stand; seven joined the Court's opinion and two concurred in the judgment.
The opinion repeatedly describes itself as narrow. It does not decide the constitutionality of prohibiting firearm possession by a person who is addicted, presently intoxicated, unable to manage personal affairs, or shown through individualized evidence to be dangerous. It also does not disturb the other paragraphs of § 922(g). Hemani is therefore an as-applied constitutional ruling, not a declaration that firearms and controlled-substance use now mix lawfully in every circumstance.
Wolford v. Lopez: the government cannot reverse the property owner's default
In Wolford v. Lopez, No. 24-1046, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2026), the Court held 6–3 that Hawaii could not prohibit a licensed concealed-carry permit holder from carrying on private property open to the public unless the owner affirmatively authorized firearms. The historical default allows entry into a business open to the public subject to conditions the owner chooses to impose. The owner remains free to prohibit firearms; the State may not presume that the owner did so and criminalize licensed carry on that basis.
These decisions do not create a single dangerousness-only formula for every firearm law. They reinforce that the government must defend the particular restriction, against the particular challenge, with the text-and-history analysis Bruen and Rahimi require.
Pennsylvania's federal circuit: Range and Lara
Binding federal law in Pennsylvania. Federal district courts in Pennsylvania must follow the Third Circuit. Two decisions are central:
- Range v. Attorney General, 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc). Bryan Range pleaded guilty in 1995 to making a false statement to obtain food stamps. Pennsylvania classified the offense as a misdemeanor, but it was punishable by up to five years, which placed him within § 922(g)(1). In a civil suit brought before any future possession, the en banc court held that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied to Range. The court stressed the narrow record rather than invalidating § 922(g)(1) across the board. In April 2025, the Solicitor General told Congress that the government had decided not to seek Supreme Court review.
- Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025). The panel held that 18-to-20-year-old adults are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment and required an injunction preventing the Commissioner from arresting otherwise law-abiding members of that age group for openly carrying during a declared state of emergency. The Supreme Court denied Pennsylvania's petition on June 30, 2026. That denial did not endorse the opinion's reasoning, but it left the Third Circuit judgment in place.
The Supreme Court denied the individual's petition in Vincent v. Bondi, No. 24-1155 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026), and government petitions in United States v. Doucet, No. 25-1001 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2026), United States v. Cockerham, No. 25-1029 (U.S. June 8, 2026), and United States v. Mitchell, No. 25-935 (U.S. June 29, 2026). A denial of certiorari is not a decision on the merits. Those denials leave the circuit decisions in those cases intact but do not establish a nationwide rule about § 922(g)(1).
The calendar is not closed. As of August 22, 2026, the government's petition in United States v. Hembree, No. 25-1219, another § 922(g)(1) as-applied case, remained pending and had been distributed for the Court's September 28, 2026 conference.
What Range does—and does not—do
Range supplies controlling authority for a fact-specific as-applied challenge in federal court. It does not erase § 922(g)(1), automatically restore anyone else's rights, or turn the label “nonviolent” into a complete legal test. Courts examine the actual offense, its statutory punishment and facts, later conduct, the type of proceeding, and the historical justification offered by the government.
Do not use possession as the test case. Possessing a firearm while a disability remains in force can produce a new prosecution. Range obtained declaratory relief prospectively. A person who believes Range, Hemani, a pardon, or another remedy may apply should obtain a record-based analysis and the necessary relief before possessing, receiving, purchasing, or carrying.
The same record can produce a federal answer and a state answer
Pennsylvania has its own prohibited-person statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. It identifies enumerated offenses and additional categories involving drug convictions, specified DUI history, mental-health records, protection orders, juvenile adjudications, and other circumstances. The federal prohibitions in § 922(g) and Pennsylvania's restrictions are separate locks on the same door.
| Question | Federal side | Pennsylvania side |
|---|---|---|
| What creates the restriction? | Primarily 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), with definitions and exceptions in § 921 | Primarily 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105, plus licensing, PFA, bail, and supervision rules |
| What can remove or defeat it? | A qualifying pardon, expungement, set-aside, civil-rights restoration, § 925(c) grant, or constitutional judgment—depending on the exact disability | A qualifying pardon, statutory relief proceeding, record correction, expiration or modification of an order, or constitutional judgment—depending on the exact disability |
| Does relief cross over automatically? | No. The text creating each disability and the scope of the particular order or grant must be checked. | |
Federal circuit decisions do not bind Pennsylvania state courts when those courts interpret the federal Constitution; only the U.S. Supreme Court supplies the final nationwide answer. In Commonwealth v. Randolph, 343 A.3d 1248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025), the Superior Court treated Range as persuasive rather than binding and upheld § 6105 as applied to a defendant whose predicates were two possession-with-intent-to-deliver convictions. The court concluded that drug traffickers fit the historical dangerousness principle it applied. Randolph did not decide every possible challenge by a person with a different record.
The age question has split in the same way. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 341 A.3d 144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2025), appeal granted in part, 352 A.3d 455 (Pa. 2026), the Superior Court upheld the challenged age restrictions in a state prosecution and explained that Lara does not bind Pennsylvania courts. Meanwhile, Lara controls federal courts in this circuit.
A final rule after three decades—and a program not yet open
Federal program status on August 22, 2026. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) authorizes the Attorney General to relieve a federal firearm disability when the statutory public-safety and public-interest standards are met. Beginning in 1992, Congress barred ATF from spending appropriated funds to investigate applications, making the former process unusable. DOJ announced Federal Firearm Rights Restoration on August 17, 2026, and the final rule was published at 91 Fed. Reg. 54,054 (Aug. 20, 2026).
The rule becomes effective September 21, 2026. As of this article's review date, the online application was still marked “Coming soon,” no ordinary application window had opened, and the published rollout was:
| Date | Announced stage |
|---|---|
| September 25, 2026 | Applications open to invited candidates with a known interest in the program. |
| November 4, 2026 | Applications open to the public for the first 5,000 applicants, first come and first served. |
| January 4, 2027 | An additional 500 public applicants may apply while DOJ tests the payment portal; fee collection begins. |
| Later | Public-at-large access is planned, but DOJ has not announced a date. |
The final rule requires an online application, electronic fingerprints, disability-specific records, and affidavits from three qualified character references. DOJ's document instructions call for extensive official records, including criminal-record reports for the shorter of the past 25 years or the time since age 18 in the applicable jurisdictions. Its reference rules require three people who are not related by blood or marriage, have known the applicant at least three years, and are not themselves prohibited under § 922(g). An application fee begins in the announced January stage; the rule allows an applicant to request a reduction or waiver.
The rule's presumptions are demanding, but they are presumptions
DOJ's published criteria organize the rule's presumptions into five categories: current-status, permanent, ten-year, five-year, and reapplication. Mental-health disability appears within the current-status category when an alternative relief program is available and the applicant has not applied, has an application pending, or was denied. The permanent category covers specifically listed felony conduct, not every offense that someone might colloquially call violent. The ten-year category includes drug trafficking, threats, explosives, certain firearm and school-weapon conduct, animal abuse, and misdemeanor domestic violence. The five-year category covers other felonies and specified violent misdemeanors. A conviction or any portion of the broadly defined sentence within the relevant lookback can trigger the presumption.
Even these categories are not absolute eligibility bans: the rule permits a presumption to be overcome through extraordinary circumstances. Conversely, waiting out a lookback does not guarantee relief. The Attorney General must still decide that the applicant is not likely to endanger public safety and that relief would not be contrary to the public interest.
A grant addresses only the identified federal firearm disability. It does not pardon, expunge, or set aside the underlying conviction, override an independent Pennsylvania prohibition, or cover a later-acquired disability. No Pennsylvania owner should treat an application—or even a federal grant—as permission to possess until the state side has been independently resolved.
The Pennsylvania wrinkle in § 6105(d)(3)
The Pennsylvania interaction requires care. For qualifying disabilities, § 6105(d)(3) links two separate conditions: federal relief from the disability arising from the predicate conviction, which a Pennsylvania court may waive if Congress has not appropriated enough money to process eligible applications, and ten years, excluding incarceration, since the applicant's most recent conviction in specified categories. The ten years do not begin when federal relief is granted, and the statute does not state a blanket ten-year conviction-free requirement.
During the federal funding restriction, that express waiver clause gave Pennsylvania courts a route that did not depend on an actual § 925(c) grant. The new DOJ process may change the waiver analysis for applicants who can use it, but no Pennsylvania appellate decision has yet resolved that question under the 2026 rule.
The Pennsylvania text still refers to relief from the Secretary of the Treasury, although § 925(c) authority now rests with the Attorney General. Pennsylvania's successor-officer rule, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1938, supplies a substantial textual argument for treating an Attorney General grant as satisfying that condition, but no Pennsylvania appellate court has yet applied § 1938 to a grant under the 2026 program. Pennsylvania State Police v. Paulshock, 836 A.2d 110, 115–16 (Pa. 2003), already establishes the reverse limit: a Pennsylvania § 6105(d) order cannot by itself remove a federal disability. The new process may make both-lock relief practically available to some qualifying applicants; it does not make either side automatic.
The rest of the 2026 map
Medical marijuana and other controlled-substance use
Hemani matters to Pennsylvania medical-marijuana patients because marijuana remains federally controlled, but the decision must be read at its actual width. It rejected Hemani's prosecution on the evidence and theory the government presented. It did not remove § 922(g)(3) from the United States Code, authorize firearm possession while intoxicated, or decide cases involving addiction, incapacity, or individualized proof of danger.
As of August 22, 2026, the current downloadable ATF Form 4473 still asked in Question 21.f about unlawful use or addiction and still carried its marijuana warning; ATF's current-form page continued to identify the August 2023 revision. The Pennsylvania State Police firearms page also continued to warn that medical-marijuana use or card status can result in a federal prohibition. Official ATF and PSP searches located no post-Hemani implementation guidance by the review date.
Nor should anyone infer permission to answer a federal or state purchase form inaccurately. A medical card plus a firearm question calls for current, case-specific advice before possession, purchase, transfer, or an application.
18-to-20-year-old adults
Lara protects young adults' unlicensed open carry within the specific federal judgment described above. It did not hold that every under-21 applicant is entitled to an LTCF, and § 6109(b) still says a Pennsylvania resident must be 21 to apply. The current PSP carry page likewise continued to state that an applicant must be 21 or older. The federal/state split with Williams, plus the differences among open carry, concealed carry, vehicle carry, Philadelphia, and emergency restrictions, make this a poor area for headline-only decisions. Our LTCF and PICS-challenge guide explains the procedures that remain in place.
Protection From Abuse orders
Rahimi confirms that the Second Amendment permits temporary disarmament when a court has found a credible threat to another person's physical safety. Federal § 922(g)(8) also requires notice and an opportunity to participate, a covered relationship and restraint, and either a credible-threat finding or specified language prohibiting the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Pennsylvania PFAs carry their own state relinquishment and possession consequences, which need not match the federal elements word for word. Review the PFA practice overview and our guide to PFA, custody, criminal, and firearm interactions before assuming an order does—or does not—create both restrictions.
DUI and firearm restrictions
Pennsylvania's DUI provision is commonly misstated. Under § 6105(c)(3), three or more DUI convictions on separate occasions within five years restrict transfers and purchases after the third conviction; the paragraph does not itself prohibit continued possession of firearms already lawfully held. Section 6105(e)(2) supplies a state relief route after its separate ten-year period.
Federal law asks a different question. Section 922(g)(1), together with § 921(a)(20), can reach a Pennsylvania offense punishable by more than one year, while excluding a state misdemeanor punishable by two years or less. Some repeat DUIs are graded as first-degree misdemeanors or felonies and therefore require federal analysis even when Pennsylvania's three-in-five purchase rule does not apply. If a criminal case is still pending, the grading and resolution can matter. See the firm's DUI-defense page, criminal-defense page, and the article explaining Shifflett, ARD, and the current repeat-DUI statute.
Record clearing is not the same as rights restoration
Expungement, Clean Slate limited access, a pardon, state firearm relief, and federal § 925(c) relief do different work. Sealing a record from ordinary public view does not itself remove a firearm restriction. A full Pennsylvania Governor's pardon can be a powerful part of the state and federal analysis, but the specific pardon, any later expungement, and the federal “unless” clause in § 921(a)(20) still must be examined. The Pennsylvania record-clearing router separates those remedies and their limits.
What to do with a real record
- Identify the exact event. Obtain certified dispositions and sentencing records; PFA petitions and orders; mental-health commitment and certification paperwork; juvenile records; and any pardon, expungement, restoration, or appeal order.
- Identify both restrictions. Analyze federal §§ 921–925 and Pennsylvania § 6105 separately, along with any bail, probation, parole, licensing, or protection-order condition.
- Match the remedy to the source. Depending on the record, the possible route may be a correction or PICS challenge, pardon, § 6105(d), (e), or (f) proceeding, § 6111.1(g) mental-health-record proceeding, § 925(c) application when the relevant window opens, or a prospective constitutional action.
- Sequence the work. Some relief affects only one system, some remedies require another step, and some deadlines—especially a PICS challenge—run quickly. An application that has not been granted changes nothing.
The firm's firearm-rights practice page explains representation for eligibility reviews, PICS matters, restoration proceedings, and firearm charges.
Until the record and both systems have been resolved, do not assume that a new appellate decision or announced program restored your rights. Possession while still prohibited can turn a potentially remediable record into a new state or federal charge.
This article states federal and Pennsylvania law as of the date shown. Decisions, statutes, rules, forms, and program dates may change. This is general information, not legal advice about any particular record or a promise of restoration or any outcome. Reading this page does not create an attorney-client relationship.